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15.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the case of generational accounting in New Zealand. 
In contrast to the experience of most countries in the world, future generations 
of New Zealanders are likely to face lower net tax burdens than current genera- 
tions because of the prudent approach to fiscal policy undertaken in the recent 
past and projected to continue into the future. Under a range of plausible policy 
outcomes, New Zealand’s generational accounts are likely to be close to bal- 
ance, with a slight bias in favor of future generations. 
This result is not accidental. In 1984, New Zealand faced a deep fiscal crisis, 
which forced fundamental changes in the structure of the economy, and in par- 
ticular in the structure of the government’s finances. A series of reforms, initi- 
ated in  1984 by the newly elected Labour government  and extended by the 
National government elected in 1990, reversed years of poor economic perfor- 
mance and bad fiscal management. These reforms culminated in the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1994, which requires, among other things, that the gov- 
ernment balance the budget over the business cycle. 
The recent election held on 12 October 1996 will prove to be a historical 
watershed, not because of the policies of the government brought to power- 
after all, the policies of the National-New  Zealand First coalition are not very 
different from those of the National-United  coalition that preceded it-but 
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because it is the first government elected under the new German-style mixed 
membership proportional (MMP) electoral system. 
Under the old English-style system, New Zealand governments were able 
to deal with crisis efficiently by ramming legislation  through the unicameral 
House of Representatives, often on a strict party vote, and without serious chal- 
lenge from the opposition. Under MMP, electing a majority party government 
will be more difficult, raising the likelihood of coalition governments in the 
future, and the associated problems in passing  legislation. Under MMP the 
reforms initiated in the past 23 years would have been more difficult to imple- 
ment, but MMP will also make them more difficult to reverse. 
In preparing New Zealand's generational accounts, it is assumed that future 
governments will remain committed to the concept of a balanced budget over 
the course of the business cycle, as mandated by the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
Indeed, even the leftist Alliance Party has promised to fund its social welfare 
agenda though  tax increases, not deficit spending, should it become part of 
the government. 
A more detailed description of the New Zealand economy and current fiscal 
policy follows in section 15.2. Section 15.3 presents the assumptions behind 
the generational account calculations, while Section 15.4 presents the findings 
and discusses their implications and sensitivity to assumptions. Section 15.5 
compares  these  results to a  1995 study  of  generational accounting  in New 
Zealand (see Auerbach et al. 1997). 
15.2  The New Zealand Fiscal Situation 
In order to understand New Zealand's current fiscal situation, it is necessary 
to understand  a bit of  recent economic history, particularly  the reforms that 
began in 1984 and are continuing today.' 
From its early days, the government played a dominant role in New Zea- 
land's  economy, owning major enterprises in many  sectors of the economy, 
including transport, communications, and finance, and restricting other sectors 
with stifling regulation. Until the mid- 1980s, the domestic economy was shel- 
tered from international competition with extensive import and capital restric- 
tions, and domestic industry was supported with a range of subsidies. The gov- 
ernment operated a generous social  welfare system and provided  universal 
health  care and education. Britain's entry into the European  Community  in 
1973, which ended New Zealand's tariff-free exports to Britain, dealt a severe 
blow to New Zealand's terms of  trade, as did the two oil shocks of the 1970s. 
The reaction  of  the  government  to the  second  oil  shock exacerbated  New 
Zealand's fiscal problems as the government sought to ease the crisis with old- 
fashioned Keynesian stimulus, financing major infrastructure and energy proj- 
ects while increasing subsidies to domestic businesses. 
This spending, in combination with higher social welfare spending and in- 
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terest on the burgeoning debt, increased financial net expenditure (which ex- 
cludes lending activities) from 25.6 percent of GDP in fiscal 1973/74 to 38.3 
percent in  1983/84. Part of this spending was financed through higher taxes, 
as revenue increased from 26.5 percent of GDP to 31.8 percent, but much was 
financed through borrowing, as the financial balance swung from a surplus of 
1.0 percent of  GDP to a deficit of  6.5 percent. Net debt grew from just 4.5 
percent of GDP in 1973 to 31.5 percent in 1984. 
As the fourth Labour government took office in  1984, the New  Zealand 
economy was performing poorly. Real growth had averaged only 2 percent per 
year from 1973 to 1984. Inflation was enjoying a brief but temporary respite 
from double-digit rates, and short-term interest rates were about 14 percent. 
The New Zealand dollar had fallen from U.S.$1.48  in 1973 to below $0.47 by 
the end of 1984. 
The incoming government instituted a series of reforms designed to reduce 
the deficit, stabilize  the economy, and improve efficiency. In its first budget, the 
government announced cuts in subsidies and reform of the tax system. These 
measures were designed both to reduce the deficit and to increase economic ef- 
ficiency. 
In terms of macroeconomic stability, the government directed the Reserve 
Bank to reduce inflation. The Reserve Bank Act of  1989 formalized the re- 
quirement that the Reserve Bank’s sole focus should be the achievement and 
maintenance of price stability. 
The government set out to improve the performance of the public sector by 
setting clear goals for public sector managers and giving greater flexibility for 
their achievement, including the right to set their own salary structures. 
The government also introduced major tax reforms aimed at broadening the 
tax base and reducing marginal rates. A comprehensive goods and services tax 
was introduced. Personal tax rates were reduced to 24 percent for income up to 
$30,875 and 33 percent above. Tax rebates to low earners created an additional 
effective marginal rate of 15 percent up to $9,500. Corporate tax rates were set 
at 33 percent. 
The government also undertook a major deregulation effort, particularly 
with regard to the financial services sector. The newfound freedoms may have 
contributed to a speculative bubble on the share market, and when the stock 
market in New York crashed in 1987, repercussions were deeply felt in New 
Zealand. While the aftereffects of the crash were relatively minor around the 
world, in New Zealand the crash coincided with the beginning of a sustained 
period of difficult times. At the end of September 1992, the level of GDP was 
about even with that of December 1987. 
In October of  1990, a new National Party government took office and em- 
braced the Labour reforms, adding new reforms of its own. The Employment 
Contracts Act of  1991 substantially removed regulation of the labor markets. 
The 199  1 budget introduced sweeping changes, including reductions in social 
welfare benefits, introduction of “user pays,” and restructuring of the provision 
of  health, education, and housing benefits. The budget also introduced new 350  Bruce Baker 
antievasion and avoidance measures and increases in taxes on alcohol and to- 
bacco. 
In  1994, the Fiscal Responsibility Act was passed to enhance fiscal perfor- 
mance over time. The act requires, among other things, that New Zealand’s net 
debt be reduced to “prudent” levels and that the operating balance remain in 
surplus over time. The act also requires future budgets, beginning with 1994, to 
use generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The new GAAP mea- 
sures include accrual-based operating statements and balance sheets with cash- 
based cash-flow and borrowings statements. The new data set allows for a more 
comprehensive view of the Crown’s finances and more sophisticated control. 
Through the difficult period of adjustment from 1983/84 to surplus in 19931 
94, net financial expenditure initially increased from 38.3 percent of GDP to 
its high-water mark of 42.1 percent of GDP in 1990191, before falling off to 
35.6 percent in  1993/94. Revenue followed the same path, increasing from 
3 I .8 percent of GDP to a high of 39.9 percent in 1989/90, before falling off to 
36.5 percent in 1993/94. The adjusted financial balance rose from a deficit of 
6.5 percent of GDP to a surplus of  1.0 percent of GDP in 1993/94. Net debt 
increased from 31.3 percent in 1983/84 of GDP to a peak of  52.6 percent in 
1991/92. With some assistance from asset sales, net debt fell to 43.2 percent 
of GDP by the end of 1993194. 
Having turned the corner on the deficit, and faced with projections of ever 
increasing surpluses, the government announced a program of tax reductions, 
to be implemented in the 1996/97 and 1997/98 fiscal years, provided that net 
debt was projected to fall within the “prudent” range, that is, under 30 percent 
of GDP in the first tax cut year. The first tax cut became effective in July 1996 
and reduced the lower statutory rate from 24 to 21.5 percent while raising the 
threshold for the top rate from $30,875 to $34,200. The second tax cut was 
scheduled to take effect in July 1997. 
On 12 October 1996, New Zealand elected its first government under MMP.2 
On election night, National won a plurality of the votes cast with 34 percent, 
followed by  Labour with 28 percent,  the populist New Zealand First Party 
with 13 percent, and the Alliance with 10 percent. The staunchly free market 
Association of Consumers and Taxpayers won 6 percent of the vote, while the 
centrist United Party with less than  1 percent of the vote failed to meet the 
normal 5 percent threshold but gained a single seat in Parliament by winning 
a constituency seat.3  The Christian Coalition and other smaller parties failed 
to meet the threshold and won no seats. 
2. Proportional representation had been under consideration in New Zealand for many years, 
driven by  the perception that the old first-past-the-post system produced unfair results. E.g., the 
National Party held power for nine years, from 1975 to 1984, although Labour won more votes in 
the 1978 and 1981 elections. In the  1993 elections, the last under the old system, the left-wing 
Alliance Party won 18 percent of  the vote but just 2 percent of the seats in Parliament. 
3. For  a  detailed  description  of  MMP election  rules,  see  Electoral  Commission  of  New 
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MMP has been described as a system where the “winner of the bronze deter- 
mines who gets the gold.” After a series of protracted negotiations with both 
National and Labour, the third-place finisher, New Zealand First, decided to go 
into coalition with National. While details of  the negotiations are still secret, 
speculation in the press centered on a number of factors that tipped the balance 
in National’s favor. First of  all, the combined  seats of  National  and  New 
Zealand First gave the coalition an absolute majority in Parliament. A coalition 
with Labour would have required the support of the Alliance, who would have 
expected some kind of  payback, an unappealing prospect from the point of 
view of  New  Zealand First. Second, New  Zealand First was uncomfortable 
with the amount of new spending proposed by  Labour. Finally, National of- 
fered the leader of New Zealand First the newly created position of treasurer, 
carrying substantial power over fiscal and monetary policy. 
The coalition agreement between the parties calls for additional spending of 
about 1.2 percent of GDP in fiscal 1997198, 1.7 percent in  1998/99, and 2.1 
percent in  1999/2000. About 70 percent of  the additional spending is ear- 
marked for health and education, two areas that are widely seen as under- 
funded. Additional revenue in 1997/98 is to be provided by defemng the sec- 
ond round of  tax cuts, originally scheduled for 1 July  1997, until one year 
later. In future years, higher spending is to be paid for out of  the currently 
predicted surpluses. 
New Zealand First has also proposed to introduce a compulsory private re- 
tirement savings scheme, provided voters approve a referendum on the matter. 
The scheme would be funded through new withholding taxes, roughly offset 
by future rounds of tax cuts. 
The coalition agreement points  to  one probable consequence of  MMP, 
which is that future governments will find it harder to control spending. With 
multiparty coalitions (formal or informal) the most common form of govern- 
ment, it is likely that governments will find it necessary to provide funding for 
a longer list of budgetary priorities, as “rewards” and “bribes” replace strict 
party discipline as the glue that holds the government together. 
15.3  Assumptions Underlying the Generational Account Calculations 
Generational accounts are based on net present values of  taxes paid and 
transfers received  by  different generations over  their remaining  lifetimes. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have long-term projections of taxes, transfers, and 
other government spending. It is also necessary to have long-term projections 
of population by age and sex. 
To  link the aggregate projections of  taxes and transfers to the appropriate 
generations, a series of  “profiles” of taxpayers and transfer recipients by  age 
and sex are also required. These projections and profiles are used to form cash 
flows for each generation. In order to translate the dollar amounts into present 
values, it is necessary to have  a discount rate. Finally, in order to solve the 352  Bruce Baker 
intertemporal budget constraint, it is necessary to have an initial value of gov- 
ernment wealth. 
Beyond the quantitative assumptions are a number of  theoretical assump- 
tions about the incidence of taxes. The general assumption used is that the tax 
burden is ultimately borne by  the payers of each tax type. However, there is 
one major exception to the rule. For the company income tax, it is assumed 
that the tax is ultimately borne by  workers. Because New Zealand is a small 
open economy, it is reasonable to assume that taxes on mobile corporate capital 
are borne by  local factors, in this case labor. An  alternative simulation was 
performed assuming that company tax is ultimately borne by  the owners of 
capital. 
Population Projections. The population projections used are special very long 
term extensions of Statistics New Zealand's central population projections (se- 
ries 6). The projections assume medium fertility (1.90 children per woman), 
medium mortality (life expectancy rises from 73.6 years in  1994 to 79.5 in 
2031 for males, from 79.2 to 84.0 for females), and annual immigration of 
5,000 (roughly the average for the past 20 years). Beyond 203 1, life expectancy 
continues to rise, but more slowly than in the first period. 
One implication of the medium-fertility assumption, which is below the re- 
placement rate, is that the number of children per person of working age drops 
from 45.2 percent in 1995 to 35.8 percent in 2100. However, increasing lon- 
gevity  leads the number  of  elderly per  working-age person  to  more  than 
double, from 19.5 percent in 1995 to 49.7 percent in 2100. Overall, the depen- 
dency ratio increases from 64.7 percent in 1995 to 85.4 percent in 2100. See 
table 15.1. 
Fiscal Projections. All fiscal projections were made with Treasury's long-term 
fiscal model. National fiscal aggregates were supplemented with projections 
of the relatively small tax and spending activity of local authorities. In New 
Zealand most  governmental activity is funded and provided at the national 
level. There are no states or provinces. 
Taxes are categorized as wage income taxes, nonwage income taxes, corpo- 
rate income taxes, goods and services tax (GST), excise taxes, local property 
taxes, and other taxes. Transfer payments are categorized as superannuation 
benefits, health, unemployment insurance, family and housing benefits, educa- 
tion, and other benefits. 
It was necessary to make a number of adjustments to the basic GAAP num- 
bers. New Zealand social welfare benefits are generally taxable, and the GAAP 
transfer numbers are gross of tax. These taxes were removed from both the 
income tax and transfers in order to allocate taxes and transfers to generations 
on a net basis. GST paid by  the government to itself was similarly removed. It 
was also necessary to adjust the GAAP capital spending estimates to a concept 
compatible with the generational accounting method. In GAAP, capital expen- 353  Generational Accounting in New Zealand 
Table 15.1  Population Projections 
~~~  ~ 
Population (thousands)  Dependency Ratios (%) 
Children  Working Age  Elderly 























3,577  98 1 
3,743  1,017 
3,887  1,03  1 
4,008  997 
4,119  957 
4.226  936 
4,325  935 
4,405  940 
4,456  934 
4,474  914 
4,468  891 
4,447  877 
4,418  87 1 
4,387  867 
4,354  859 
4,320  846 
4,285  832 
4,247  822 
4,205  813 
4,162  805 
4,119  797 













































19.5  45.2 
20.0  44.7 
20.4  43.5 
21.4  40.2 
24.0  37.5 
26.9  36.1 
31.5  36.3 
36.4  37.0 
39.8  37.1 
42.7  36.6 
42.9  35.6 
42.4  35.0 
43.3  35.2 
45.3  35.8 
46.8  36.1 
47.6  35.9 
47.6  35.6 
47.6  35.4 
48.1  35.5 
48.8  35.7 
49.4  35.8 























Sources: 1995-205 1 from Statistics New Zealand; 2052-2 100 from author’s calculations. 
diture is treated as a financing item, which affects accumulation of debt but 
is not reflected directly in the operating balance. The operating balance uses 
depreciation instead. However, in order to correctly attribute spending to the 
generation that actually paid for it, a timing adjustment was needed. A further 
adjustment was  made to remove administrative expenses from transfers and 
allocate them to government consumption. 
For the current year,  1996/97, the base case was identical to the baseline in 
the 1996 budget. For the three following years, the coalition agreement was 
added onto the budget. Beginning in fiscal 2000/01, individual income taxes 
were reduced to phase out the budget surplus over three years, after which the 
budget remained in balance year by  year. All projections were done in nominal 
dollars and then converted into constant 1995/96 dollars, the base year for the 
accounts. The base-case assumption of  balanced annual budgets involves a 
short-run reduction in individual income tax rates relative to current law. 
As figure 15.1 shows, the amount of revenue required to balance the budget 
over the next decade will tend to fall as a percentage of GDP. This is partly 
due to favorable demographic pressures-the  cohort of new retirees, born dur- 354  Bruce Baker 
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Fig. 15.1  Tax-to-GDP  ratio underlying generational account calculations 
ing the Depression, is a relatively small cohort, as is the cohort of students now 
of university age. This effect is also partly due to the legislated increase in the 
age of  qualification for New Zealand  superannuation,  from 62 to 65 years, 
being phased in through the year 2000. During this period, the number of su- 
perannuitants is projected to fall. However, these favorable circumstances will 
not last long. Beginning around 2010, the oldest members of the “baby boom” 
generation will begin to retire and will be joined by their younger brethren in 
ever larger numbers. Around 2040, the peak of  the baby boomers will have 
passed away, providing a brief fiscal respite, but in the long term, the tension 
between greater longevity and low fertility will lead to continuing increases in 
the tax-to-GDP ratios required to balance the budget. Of course, this assumes 
continuation of retirement at age 65. 
The generally sanguine finding of  this chapter that future generations of 
New Zealanders will face a lower net  tax burden  does not deny that future 
generations will face a higher gross tax burden needed to pay the higher health 
and superannuation costs that come with longer life spans. 
Tar and  Transfer Projiles. Most of the tax and transfer profiles used  in the 
generational account calculations were developed from Statistics New Zea- 
land‘s Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS). The HEIS is a sur- 
vey of about 4,600 New Zealand households. 
In New Zealand, health and education are usually provided in kind, and they 
were thus not included in the survey. For these categories of expenses, profiles 
were developed from administrative data. 355  Generational Accounting in New Zealand 
Government Wealth. For government wealth, the measure used is equal to the 
government’s net financial assets, equal to financial assets less gross debt. Al- 
though New Zealand has a full balance sheet available, the Crown’s tangible 
assets were excluded from this measure because the flows associated with these 
assets (both revenues and expenses) are already incorporated in the govern- 
ment’s spending and revenue projections. Including the assets would amount 
to double counting in present value terms. An alternative way of handling pro- 
ductive assets would have been to include the assets and to exclude the reve- 
nues and expenditures associated with the assets. In theory, both approaches 
are equivalent because the present value of the net revenue from the productive 
assets should equal the asset’s value. 
Discount Rates. The appropriate discount rate for calculating the present value 
of future amounts depends on whether these amounts are known with certainty. 
Future government receipts and expenditures are risky, which suggests that 
they be discounted by a rate higher than the real rate of interest on government 
securities. On the other hand, government receipts and expenditures appear to 
be less volatile than the real return on capital, which suggests that they be 
discounted by  a lower rate than that. The base-case calculations assume a 5 
percent real discount rate, which is approximately equal to the government’s 
assumed long-term borrowing rate. Alternative simulations were performed 
with real discount rates of 3 and 7 percent. 
15.4  Findings 
This section includes a discussion of the results for the baseline case fol- 
lowed by  a sensitivity analysis and a discussion of some alternative scenarios. 
15.4.1  Baseline Results 
Tables 15.2 and 15.3 present the basic set of generational accounts for males 
and females for the base year of  1995/96, assuming a 5 percent real discount 
rate and a 1.5 percent productivity growth rate (table 15.4 reports combined 
results). For each of several cohorts ranging in age from 0 to 90 the tables list 
the generational account and the breakdown of this account into the compo- 
nents of household payments and receipts. The row at the bottom of each table 
labeled “future generations” provides the generational account, adjusted for 
economic growth, for the representative male or female of each future genera- 
tion. This account for future generations is calculated as a residual, based on 
the assumption that current policy will continue to hold for existing genera- 
tions and the requirement of intertemporal government budget balance. 
Looking at the first column of table 15.2, one can observe that the genera- 
tional account for male newborns is $47,700 (all dollar amounts are expressed 
in  U.S. dollars, converted from New Zealand dollars at a rate of NZ$1.00 = Table 15.2  Composition of Male Generational Accounts: Base Case (present value of receipts and payments in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Wage  Nonwage  Corporate  Family 
Generation’s  Net  Income  Income  Income  Excise  Property  Super-  and  Other 






















47.7  47.1  14.1 
61.2  52.2  16.3 
80.3  57.4  18.8 
104.6  63.6  21.8 
132.3  71.5  25.0 
158.9  81.7  30.3 
158.5  79.8  32.2 
145.0  72.5  33.0 
122.4  62.4  33.6 
91.0  49.3  33.3 
57.9  35.3  32.6 
26.3  22.3  31.1 
-3.2  12.1  29.0 
-35.4  3.8  26.1 
-41.1  0.1  22.6 
-40.9  0.0  18.4 
-36.8  0.0  13.8 
-36.1  0.0  9.3 
-31.1  0.0  4.7 
42.6 
-  10.8 
22.7  32.5 
26.7  35.6 
31.4  38.1 
36.6  39.5 
42.4  41.1 
49.5  45.6 
48.8  44.7 
44.3  42. I 
37.9  39.3 
29.5  35.6 
20.8  31.5 
12.8  27.1 
6.6  22.6 
1.9  18.2 
0.0  14.2 
0.0  10.6 
0.0  7.6 
0.0  5.4 
0.0  3.8 
8.3  4.6 
9.9  5.6 
11.8  6.8 
13.9  8.1 
15.8  10.0 
18.0  12.1 
17.8  12.8 
16.6  12.9 
15.1  12.6 
13.2  11.9 
11.1  11.1 
9.0  10.1 
7.0  9.1 
5.1  8.1 
3.5  7.0 
2.3  5.8 
1.4  4.5 
0.9  3.1 







































5.4  3.5 
6.4  4.2 
7.7  5.0 
9.0  5.8 
9.8  6.7 
9.  I  7.7 
7.3  7.3 
5.8  6.4 
4.8  5.3 
4.1  4.1 
3.4  3.1 
2.3  2.2 
1 .0  1.4 
0.0  1.0 
0.0  0.7 
0.0  0.5 
0.0  0.4 
0.0  0.3 







































Note:  Productivity growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; real discount rate, 5 percent. Table 15.3  Composition of Female Generational Accounts: Base Case (present value of receipts and payments in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Wage  Nonwage  Corporate  Family 
Generation’s  Net  Income  Income  Income  Excise  Property  Super-  and 
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12.2  33.3  5.6  5.3 
14.4  36.7  6.7  6.5 
17.0  39.4  8.0  7.8 
20.0  41.2  9.5  9.5 
22.9  43.7  10.8  11.8 
24.4  47.6  11.6  14.2 
22.8  46.0  10.9  14.5 
20.8  43.7  10.0  14.4 
18.2  41.1  9.1  14.1 
14.5  37.7  8.0  13.6 
10.1  33.9  6.9  13.0 
5.8  29.7  5.7  12.3 
2.6  25.3  4.5  11.5 
0.6  20.9  3.3  10.4 
0.0  16.7  2.3  8.9 
0.0  13.0  1.5  1.2 
0.0  9.8  0.9  5.3 
0.0  7.3  0.6  3.5 
0.0  5.3  0.4  2.2 
8.1  28.4  2.7  8.5 
9.5  27.8  3.2  10.1 
11.3  30.5  3.9  11.9 
13.3  33.4  4.5  14.0 
16.3  35.0  4.7  16.3 
20.8  38.4  3.5  17.3 
37.5  2.5  14.5  24.2 
28.6  36.9  2.1  10.8 
34.6  36.8  1.9  7.5 
41.7  36.8  1.6  5.0 
50.5  37.6  1.2  3.6 
61.1  38.6  0.7  3.0 
74.1  40.3  0.3  2.4 
80.6  42.5  0.0  2.0 
73.2  39.7  0.0  1.7 
61.0  37.9  0.0  1.3 
1.1  49.3  30.7  0.0 
39.7  25.4  0.0  1  .O 







































Nore: Productivity growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; real discount rate, 5 percent. Table 15.4  Composition of Combined Generational Accounts: Base Case (present value of receipts and payments in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
~~ 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Wage  Nonwage  Corporate  Fdmly 
Generation’s  Net  Income  Income  Income  Excise  Property  Super-  and  Other 

















































































17.6  32.9 
20.7  36.1 
24.2  38.8 
28.4  40.4 
32.6  42.4 
36.7  46.6 
35.4  45.4 
32.1  43.0 
27.6  40.2 
22.0  36.7 
15.5  32.7 
9.3  28.4 
4.5  24.0 
1.3  19.5 
0.0  15.6 
0.0  12.0 
0.0  8.9 
0.0  6.7 
0.0  4.9 
7.0  5.0 
8.3  6.0 
9.9  7.3 
11.7  8.8 
13.3  10.9 
14.7  13.2 
14.2  13.7 
13.2  13.6 
12.0  13.4 
10.6  12.8 
9.1  12.0 
7.4  11.2 
5.7  10.3 
4.2  9.2 
2.8  8.1 
1.8  6.6 
1.1  4.9 
0.7  3.4 
0.5  2.2 
6.6  25.0 
7.7  23.2 
9.2  25.2 
10.8  27.0 
13.2  28.6 
17.0  32.3 
20.0  32.6 
23.7  32.9 
28.5  33.9 
34.0  34.9 
40.9  35.5 
49.5  36.4 
60.7  38.1 
69.6  40.3 
64.0  37.9 
53.3  36.4 
43.4  29.8 
36.2  25.6 
27.7  18.9 
4.1  5.9 
4.9  7.1 
5.8  8.4 
6.8  9.8 
7.2  11.5 
6.2  12.6 
4.8  11.0 
3.9  8.7 
3.3  6.4 
2.9  4.6 
2.3  3.4 
1.5  2.6 
0.7  1.9 
0.0  I .5 
0.0  1.2 
0.0  I  .o 
0.0  0.8 
0.0  0.8 







































Nore: Productivity growth assumed to be  1.5 percent; real discount rate, 5 percent. 359  Generational Accounting in New Zealand 
U.S.$0.70). The generational account rises steadily until age 25 and falls there- 
after. The initial rise is due to the fact that the heaviest taxpaying years loom 
closer and closer as one ages from childhood to young adulthood. The fall in 
the generational account occurs thereafter as more taxpaying years fall into the 
past and the receipt of old-age pensions and health benefits approaches. The 
typical 40-year-old has an account of $122,400, while a 65-year-old, entering 
years of peak transfer receipt, has an account of minus $35,400. In interpreting 
this pattern, it is important to remember that a generation’s account equals the 
present value of  its remaining lifetime net tax payments to the government. 
Thus one cannot directly compare the accounts of different current generations 
to determine their relative lifetime burdens. 
Perhaps the most salient general observation to make about these accounts 
is that they indicate that future generations will bear a lower lifetime net tax 
burden than current newborns. That is, under the base-case assumptions, it will 
be necessary to reduce taxes on or increase transfers to future generations in 
order to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. For males 
and females combined, the reduction in lifetime tax burden is about $2,000, or 
10.8 percent of  the net burden faced by current newborns. While the amount 
is not great, it stands in marked contrast to those for other countries, which 
generally indicate that future generations will face a substantially higher bur- 
den than current generations. 
A second important observation to make about these base-case results is the 
distinction between males and females. Though males and females have the 
same general pattern of generational accounts that first rise and then fall with 
respect to age, the accounts for females at each age are considerably lower 
than those for males of  the same age. While today’s newborn males face a 
lifetime net tax burden of  $47,700, females face a burden that is negative, 
-$13,300.  That is, they will receive transfers and government educational 
spending that, in present value, exceed the taxes they will pay  during their 
lifetimes. These results come from a combination of women’s lower tax pay- 
ments and higher transfer receipts. The lower tax payments are due in large 
part to women’s lower projected labor force earnings, which in turn reduce 
their relative burdens of  labor income taxes and corporate income taxes (the 
latter due to our assumption about the incidence of such taxes being on labor). 
The higher transfer payments come in part from the fact that social welfare 
benefits during child-raising years go primarily to women, but even more from 
women’s  greater share of  superannuation benefits and health benefits in old 
age, a result due to greater female life expectancy. 
Tables 15.2 and 15.3 also permit a number of other interesting observations 
regarding the New  Zealand fiscal system. One is the importance of  indirect 
taxes. For newborn males, over one-third of all lifetime taxes take the form of 
indirect taxes (GST plus specific excise taxes); for females, this share is nearly 
one-half. On the transfer side, the largest program for both men and women is 
education.  While, in absolute  terms, pension benefits are larger, they occur much 
later in life and hence have a smaller present value than educational benefits. 360  Bruce Baker 
15.4.2  Sensitivity Analysis 
Generational accounts are sensitive to the assumptions used  in their con- 
struction. In particular, they are sensitive to the assumed rates of discount and 
productivity growth. To a lesser extent, they are sensitive to the incidence as- 
sumptions. 
Table  15.5 presents nine sets of  calculations, corresponding to three real, 
before-tax interest rates (3, 5, and 7 percent) and three rates of  multifactor 
productivity growth (1, 1.5, and 2 percent). The center column corresponds to 
the base-case assumptions of a 5 percent rate of interest and a 1.5 percent rate 
of productivity growth. For each combination of discount rate and productivity 
growth rate, the table shows generational accounts for newborns and future 
generations, and the difference between the two. 
As we move from left to right in the table, we  can observe that, for new- 
borns, a rising interest rate lowers the generational account. In fact, with a 7 
percent discount rate the generational account of newborns is generally nega- 
tive, as the present value of the health care currently being received and the 
benefits of  education, soon to be received, slightly outweigh the discounted 
present value of taxes to be paid later in life. For future generations, the same 
pattern of falling generational accounts can be observed. 
Changes in the assumed rate of productivity growth raise projected levels of 
both taxes (which depend directly on the level of economic activity) and trans- 
fers (through indexing arrangements); thus there is relatively little net impact. 
It is clear that the dollar amounts in the generational accounts are quite sen- 
sitive to the discount and growth assumptions used. However, the underlying 
message is that the accounts are in relatively close balance under most combi- 
nations of interest rate and growth. 
Next is an analysis of  alternative incidence assumptions, with the results 
given in table 15.6. The table provides the results of three simulations, all based 
on the intermediate discount rate, growth rate assumption (r  = 5.0, g = 1.5), 
the first of which is simply the base case shown in table 15.4. 
As discussed above the basic assumption in the base-case simulations is that 
the corporate income tax is borne by labor, in proportion to labor income. This 
assumption is consistent with the view of New Zealand as a small open econ- 
omy. However, it differs from the assumptions made in the past for other coun- 
tries, notably the United States, for which corporate taxes have generally been 
attributed to owners of  capital. Thus it is important to know how much the 
results for New Zealand depend on this difference in assumption, rather than 
differences in underlying fiscal structure. 
The second simulation presented in table 15.6 allocates corporate income 
taxes according to capital, rather than labor, income. As one would expect, the 
effect of this change in assumptions is to shift a part of each year’s tax burden 
from the young to the old. 
A second difference between the base-case assumptions and those used in Table 15.5  Sensitivity Analysis: Discount and Growth Rate Assumptions (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
r=3  r=5  r=7 
g=l  g = 1.5  g=2  g=l  g = 1.5  g=2  g=l  g = 1.5  g=2 
Generational accounts for 
Newborns  44.2  54.1  64.4  12.3  18.0  24.6  -2.8  -0.1  3.1 
Future generations  40.6  50.2  56.4  9.5  16.0  23.5  -4.0  -1.0  2.6 
Difference  -3.6  -3.9  -8.0  -2.8  -2.0  -1.1  -1.2  -0.9  -0.5 
Note:  r is real discount rate (percent); g is productivity growth (percent). 362  Bruce Baker 
Table 15.6  Alternative Incidence Assumptions (present value of receipts and 
payments in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Corporate  Education 
Generation’s  Tax Falls on  in Government 
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past work by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) relates to educational 
expenditures. Here, the benefits of educational expenditures have been allo- 
cated to individual generations. Leaving educational expenditures out of  the 
generational account calculations clearly would raise the level of the accounts, 
as the final column in table 15.6 shows. The accounts rise the most for the 
young  and future generations who will benefit from educational spending. 
Thus this alternative assumption changes the age profile of  generational ac- 
counts for existing generations. However, it has relatively little impact on the 
absolute size of  the  imbalance between  current newborns  and future gen- 
erations. Thus neither changes in discount and growth rates nor alternative 
incidence assumptions alter the qualitative picture offered by  the base-case re- 
sults. 
15.4.3 
Generational accounts depend heavily on the fiscal policy projections on 
which they are based. Obviously, there is considerable uncertainty about the 
actual course that fiscal policy will take over the next 200 or more years, aside 
from that indicated in subsection 15.4.2. In this section. a number of scenarios 
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Table 15.7  Summary of Alternative Cases (present value of receipts and 
payments in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Alternative Cases 
Generation’s  Debt Remains  Deficit Is  Current 















































































































have been constructed to examined the fundamental assumption that individual 
income taxes will rise and fall in order to balance the budget, year by year. 
Results are displayed in table 15.7. 
The first alternative scenario is a search for generational balance. Under the 
baseline, the budget remains in balance year by year. A consequence of  this 
assumption is that debt as a share of GDP falls as nominal debt remains con- 
stant while nominal GDP rises. In this first alternative scenario, net debt is held 
constant at 30 percent of GDP instead of falling, as in the baseline. 
This scenario is partially successful in balancing the generational accounts, 
as it reduces the imbalance in favor of future generations relative to newborns 
from $2,000 to $1,400. However, this result can also be said to reinforce the 
notion that there is no simple relationship between fiscal balance and genera- 
tional balance. 
The second scenario assumes a return to annual deficits amounting to 2.2 
percent of GDP, the average over the past 20 years. Under this scenario, the 
generational balance swings away from future generations to favor current gen- 
erations. Under this scenario, future generations face a net burden 14.6 percent 364  Bruce Baker 
higher than current generations. The principal beneficiaries of this policy are 
young adults, who face a lifetime of lower taxes. 
The third scenario assumes that income tax rates remain at  1998/99 rates 
(after two rounds of tax cuts) instead of falling and then rising as in the baseline 
scenario. Under this scenario, huge surpluses build up in the current decade, 
completely retiring the debt by  2005. Aided by interest earnings on a rapidly 
accumulating stock of financial assets, surpluses eventually build to more than 
100 percent of GDP. Under this scenario, future generations would face a net 
tax burden 51.7 percent less than that on current newborns. There are many 
reasons to regard this scenario as implausible, not the least of which is the 
assumption of relatively restrained expenditure growth in the face of huge sur- 
pluses. 
15.4.4  Achieving Generational Balance 
As an alternative to a trial-and-error search for a fiscal policy that balances 
the generational accounts as in the first alternative simulation, it is possible to 
solve the accounts backward for the required changes in inputs. Balance in this 
context means that the ratio of the net payment burden on future generations to 
that on newborns should be no higher than the rate of multifactor productivity 
growth. Most of the simulations performed for the sensitivity analysis in table 
15.5, and most of  the scenarios presented in table 15.7, indicate that future 
generations will bear a somewhat lower burden than current generations. The 
implication is that imposing generational balance may require a shift in some 
of the fiscal burden from current to future generations and is unlikely to require 
a shift in the other direction. 
Of course, many different policies could accomplish generational balance. 
Starting from the base-case assumptions, we find that each of the following 
policies would succeed in doing so: 
A reduction of 0.8 percent in all income taxes; 
A reduction of individual income taxes by  1.1 percent; 
An increase in superannuation benefits of 2.7 percent. 
15.5  Comparison with Previous New  Zealand Study 
A 1995 study of generational accounting in New Zealand, prepared for the 
New Zealand Treasury, was based on fiscal projections from the 1995 budget. 
The fiscal projections used in this chapter are generally based on the  1996 
budget, but with an additional spending package as contained in the new gov- 
ernment’s coalition agreement. Taxes are also higher in 1997/98 as the second 
round of tax cuts has been deferred by one year. 
Between 1995 and 1996, projections for short-term economic growth were 
revised downward while projections for spending were revised upward. How- 
ever, both the 1995 and 1996 budgets projected substantial budget surpluses 365  Generational Accounting in New  Zealand 
as far as the eye can see. In practice, these surpluses were ovemdden by the 
assumption made in both studies that tax rates would fall and then rise to main- 
tain year-by-year budget balance, although the phase-in of the balanced budget 
assumption was faster in the 1995 study, balancing in 1998/99 rather than in 
2001/02 as in the current study. 
Since the 1995 study was completed, there have been a number of important 
developments that have changed the demographic and fiscal projections under- 
pinning the generational accounts. 
New Demographic Projections. Statistics New Zealand has updated its popula- 
tion projections from a 1991 base to a 1994 base. In doing so, it has revisited its 
assumptions regarding fertility and mortality. It reduced its fertility assumption 
from  1.95 children per woman  to  1.90, while raising life expectancies by 
nearly two years at 203 1 (the ending point for many of its projections), a mar- 
gin that remains about constant throughout the projections to 2200. The new 
projections still assume average net immigration of 5,000 but incorporate ac- 
tual immigration in recent years, which has averaged well above 5,000. Taken 
together, these changes have adversely affected the dependency ratio through- 
out the period. 
New Fiscal Projections. The earlier study was based largely on the 1995 bud- 
get, while the current study is based on the 1996 budget, with adjustments for 
higher spending. The 1996 budget assumes weaker economic growth than the 
1995 budget, with average GDP growth through 2003/04 of 2.5  percent instead 
of 3.4 percent. The 1996 budget also assumes higher taxes and spending, even 
without the coalition agreement. 
The results from the earlier study were expressed in New Zealand dollars. 
For ease of comparability, they have been converted to U.S. dollars at the cur- 
rent exchange rate. 
Comparison of  Results against 1995 Study. Overall, the results are quite similar 
(as can be seen in table 15.8).  The balance between newborns and future gener- 
ations is substantially the same, with an imbalance of  between $2,000 and 
$3,000 in each case. However, for currently living generations, the results are 
fairly different, with the current chapter showing net payments about $16,000 
higher for 30-year-old persons. This is mainly the effect of higher taxes in the 
current baseline. With spending accounting for a share of  GDP that is about 
1.5 percent higher than before, middle-aged persons pay  substantially more 
in taxes. 
15.6  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has used generational accounting, a new tool for fiscal analysis 
and planning, to study New Zealand's long-term fiscal position. Generational 366  Bruce Baker 
Table 15.8  Comparison with 1995 Study (present value of receipts and payments 
in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Generation’s 
Age in 1995 
1996  1995 
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accounting emphasizes the importance of implicit as well as explicit govern- 
ment commitments. A key question for New Zealand is whether the country’s 
apparent fiscal health masks large implicit burdens not captured in official debt 
and deficit measures. 
The weight of evidence suggests that behind New Zealand’s projected bud- 
get surpluses, there is indeed a sound fiscal picture. Even under the base-case 
scenario of  annual budget balance for the foreseeable future, which entails 
substantial short-run tax reductions, the burden on future generations (relative 
to income) is projected to fall slightly below that on current newborns. This 
striking result is not materially changed by the adoption of alternative assump- 
tions  about economic or policy  parameters.  New  Zealand  appears to have 
avoided the large fiscal imbalances plaguing the United States and other OECD 
countries, not by placing large tax burdens on young current generations, but 
by limiting the size of its commitments. Its fiscal health, therefore, is contin- 
gent on the maintenance of such spending discipline. 367  Generational Accounting in New Zealand 
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